Walter Benjamin, in turn, was to show that such vestiges—what Eric Santner calls Santner traces this theme of creaturely life from its poetic and philosophical. This article was downloaded by: [Colorado College] On: 23 February , At: 22 Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales. It considers the films from three aspects of Santner’s creaturely life: natural history , the state of exception, and undeadness. These qualities of the creaturely as.
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Edmund Husserl is commonly presented either as a stepping stone on the path to other thinkers or as someone who started with great promise but soon stumbled into an unsavoury quagmire of Cartesianism and misguided Downloaded by [Colorado College] at His book aims primarily at readers coming to Husserl for the first time, but the author hopes that it will challenge serious Husserlian scholars as well.
He succeeds admirably on both counts. Moran persuasively argues, however, that this is no reason to International Journal of Philosophical Studies ISSN — print — online http: Some of these are peripheral, but others touch its core. Moran does a particularly good job in explaining the meaning of Husserlian idealism. Transcen- dental idealism might thus be taken to imply that consciousness creates or makes its objects.
A more felicitous way of understanding constitution is to take it to mean that the intentional act manifests or exhibits an object, or achieves its presentation: A related difficulty concerns the sense of immanence and transcen- dence. Husserl sometimes suggests that phenomenology is concerned exclusively with what is immanent to consciousness, since what is imma- nent — the act of consciousness and what it really contains — can be given absolutely to reflection.
He occasionally indicates that the only transcen- dence that concerns the phenomenologist is the transcendence that is produced within immanence. Moran makes it clear that this is not the case. Although, as Moran notes p. Husserl is essen- tially making a methodological point: Downloaded by [Colorado College] at Since this question could not really be answered, the alternative was to claim that the world is a construction formed from the subjective representations.
In his rich analy- ses of image-consciousness, however, Husserl distinguishes unequivocally between perception and imagination, on the one hand, and picture- consciousness, on the other. His grasp of the distinction between these kinds of consciousness enabled him to break with a tradition that led to a great deal of philosophical mischief.
On Creaturely Life
It preserves the integrity of the object precisely by showing how the object itself and santndr its immanent image is presented by the subject through the intentional act directed toward it. After or so, Husserl regularly referred to transcendental conscious- ness under the rubric of the transcendental ego. Moran convincingly shows, however, that such criticisms are misguided, since Husserl by no means intended to turn philosophical reflection away from the world and ordinary life.
Indeed, it is precisely xreaturely order to under- stand that world as it santneg given to consciousness, and the consciousness that gives it, that Husserl developed his theory of the reduction. It would be a mistake, however, to think that the transcendental ego Downloaded by [Colorado College] at Moran also stresses that the Husserlian ego is not simply a formal principle of unity, as it is in Kant, or a kind of sanhner, even if a spiritual one, as in Descartes.
In keeping with his introductory aims, Moran announces early in the book that he will steer away from disputes over particular Husserlian themes.
In fact, it is fortunate that one can surmise just where Moran stands on any number of contested issues, since the positions he takes or implies are interesting and usually on the mark.
January 26, 2006 – Eric Santner: “On Creaturely Life: From Rilke to Celan”
There has been a longstanding split between the interpreters on this issue: On this reading, the noema is not a third item mediating between act and object; it is precisely the object, but the object as reflected upon within the phenomenological attitude. For this reviewer, it is a real question whether the idea of immanent sensations is defensible on phenomenological grounds.
We do not perceive our Downloaded by [Colorado College] at It is one thing for Husserl to protest that his sensations should not be confused with sense- data, and another to make it clear just what they really are. Moran observes that in one case — that of time-consciousness — Husserl found the schema according to which our awareness is constituted through the animation of sensations by apprehensions to be unsatisfactory. Indeed, Moran is a particularly effective guide through the thickets of time- consciousness, which Husserl described as perhaps the most important and most difficult of all phenomenological problems.
Thanks to time-consciousness, the transcendental subject is aware of itself in its unity and identity and of its objects as temporal or as related to time. Moran makes the important obser- vation that for Husserl we have no direct consciousness of time apart from appearing temporal objects p.
He also provides an excellent account of the sense in which the transcendental ego is time-soaked, another theme to which commentators often fail to do justice. Moran covers many more topics than the handful discussed here. This excellent study amply justifies that claim. Georgetown University, Washington, D. Literature, Criticism, Philosophy Ed. The fourteen contributions in this anthology do not set out to clear a way for the French critic and writer Maurice Blanchot, to make a case for his work in the eyes of a suspicious Anglophone public.
They are happy to come too late for such a task, pife its pretensions to transposition and accommodation. They come after Blanchot, after the fact of his death in as much as after the fact of his reception in literature departments across the English-speaking world.
On the contrary, implicit in the essays collected here is a will to defer the moment in which the evaluative and classificatory practices of the traditional critic might reassert themselves. The question of where Blanchot is creagurely be ranked goes unaddressed: Blanchot is the fact of this anthology.
But what can be done with a fact? The essays in this collection can be split, a little forcibly, into three groups. A second reads Downloaded by [Colorado College] at A third group- ing in the anthology can be demarcated by an undivided focus on Blanchot: Creathrely review in the present journal should be forgiven for directing its atten- tion to the essays of the first group it is for journals with different interests to rectify the imbalance.
Here midnight is conceived as a moment of suspension and interruption. It would, however, be to attribute to Blanchot a reactive atheism if one were to interpret the apathy, boredom and immobility in his writings as elements in a soteriological version of the black mass.
Such a reading is unwilling to let passivity be what it is because it integrates it into a programme of action.
On similar grounds, Kaufman disagrees with Thomas Carl Wall, who, reformulating the Scholastic definition of matter as indeterminate possibility, construes the banality of the everyday as ericc pure possibility of history.
Hector Kollias discusses the way in which, for both Blanchot and Paul de Man, literature has become with regard to materiality the guilty conscience, so to speak, of Hegelianism.
Both writers wish to linger, to resist the concep- tual pull within language and to testify to the simultaneous independence and illegitimacy of literature in relation to philosophy. Does such a stance amount to a critique of Hegel? Or does it reassert an experience of resis- tance to the conceptual, a resistance that Hegel overcomes rather than denies and without which dialectics loses its seriousness, turning into empty play?
On Creaturely Life: Rilke, Benjamin, Sebald – Eric L. Santner – Google Books
Kollias, unlike some hasty commentators, is not concerned to extri- cate Blanchot from Hegelianism, as the characteristically Hegelian recipro- cal implications in the following quotation make clear: By ending the Phenomenology of Spirit with the Crucifixion, rather than the Resurrection or Ascension, Hegel declares kife materiality has its place in Absolute Knowledge: It is difference in its abdication from the status of principle of all entities, since it is difference not as the condition of possibility of the differentiation of beings, but rather as the passivity and obscurity to which santnfr ontology of worklessness alone is able to attend.
This is Blanchot at the very limits of Hegelianism. Blanchot was a close friend of Levinas, and Fynsk takes pains to trace their points of contact. For exam- ple, he attributes to Blanchot in The Infinite Conversation the oj Levinasian phraseology: It is hard to know what to make of such statements.
Two human beings may be absolutely opposed on a given issue, i. I would have to be actualized without remainder in all my possibilities, since absolute difference cannot establish itself in relation to the indeterminate and undecided. But as fully actualized supposing, for a moment, this to be intelligible creturely, I forgo all possibilities, including the possibility itself of an encounter with the other.
One might feel santnr such phrases are profound and illuminating, but without clarification and argu- ment one is left simply with a feeling. This is no solution to the ethical fail- ures of the West.
But it does allow us to perceive a dilemma. If the West has ,ife marked by a systematic failure in its relations to others, if its ethics has Downloaded by [Colorado College] at But such a renunciation works in its own way to muffle the ethical call: Can atheism here distinguish itself from positivism without reverting to theology?
Does literature, as inconvertible to descriptive discourse, have an interest in the circumscription of the Outside? And is it by means of anteriority a theologically conceived tran- scendence that the Outside frustrates such an aim? Literature both presents and fails to present. It enters an objection to its own presentations. Literature faces the Outside and the Outside is one of its faces: There are readers for whom Blanchot, with his murky terminology and apocalyptic pathos, is unpleasantly redolent of the orchestral music of Max Reger.
This anthology will not win them over. To these readers the collection, by virtue of its scholar- liness, diversity and insight, is sure to be welcome.
Different factors are responsible for such difficulties, but here I want to highlight only three of them. First, Putnam has made contributions in an extraordinarily wide range of areas of philosophy, from the philosophy of science to the philosophy of mind, language, mathematics, and metaphysics; and he has done so over a long stretch of time, from the s to the present.
Secondly, Putnam has embarked on a self-critical and interpretive analysis of his own philosophical development, trying to clarify aspects of his intellectual biography that he believes have been misunder- stood. Therefore, anyone attempting to write a book on Putnam must take into account his changing philosophy and then make an effort to distinguish what Putnam has said over the years from what we or even he would like to have said. Despite the fact that the book is mainly about Putnam, it aims to accomplish two different tasks, as the author clearly states at the outset.
First, there is an epistemic and ontological realist phase from the s to the mid s in which Putnam supports, among other things, a correspondence notion of truth via a causal theory of reference, as well as defending the notion of convergence and progress in science.
Secondly, there is an anti-realist period from the late s to the early s, during which Putnam endorses Downloaded by [Colorado College] at